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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A NEW DAWN FOR MUSLIMS:
ASSERTING THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POST-9/11 AMERICA

AMANY R. HACKING*
INTRODUCTION
Islam is the fastest-growing religion in America and the world.1 Many
scholars predict that Islam will soon become the largest minority religion in the
United States.2 The questions remaining for many Americans: Who are these
Muslims? Where do they fit in American society? For many legal scholars
and attorneys, the questions more specifically are: Where do Muslims fit in our
American legal system? Are their civil rights being protected in post-9/11
America?
In this Article, I will attempt to answer some of these questions. First, Part
I will provide an historical and demographic background of Muslims in
America. Part II will discuss post-9/11 discrimination that Muslims have
faced, and continue to face today. Part III will analyze several key cases that
Muslims have brought in an effort to assert their civil rights. Part IV will
discuss what can be learned from this litigation, and Part V will offer a brief
conclusion.
I. HISTORICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF MUSLIMS IN AMERICA
Muslims in America are primarily middle class and mainstream.3 There
are approximately 1.5 million Muslims over the age of eighteen, and 850,000

* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law. The author would
like to thank her research assistant, John Orbe, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article,
and her husband, James O. Hacking, III, for his tireless support and thoughtful comments.
1. Patricia J. Ponder, Walking a Fine Line—Religious Accommodation for an Increasingly
Diverse Workforce, 49 FOR DEF. 32, 32 (2007); see also Council on American-Islamic Relations,
About Islam and American Muslims, http://www.cair.com/AboutIslam/IslamBasics.aspx (last
visited March 29, 2010).
2. Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims
Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(j), U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 498 (2007).
3. A Pew study found that most Muslims report that a large proportion of their closest
friends are non-Muslim, and that there is no conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in
a modern society. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY
MAINSTREAM 2 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 STUDY], available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/
pdf/muslim-americans.pdf. Yet, 47% of those surveyed said they think of themselves first as
917
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under the age of eighteen in the United States—comprising 0.6% of the United
States adult population.4 American Muslims are an educated group, with about
one-half of them having attended college and earning annual incomes
comparable with those of the general public.5 Additionally, a recent Gallup
poll report found that American Muslim women are one of the most highlyeducated female religious groups in the United States, with only Jewish
American women attaining higher levels of education.6 A slightly larger
portion of Muslims has not completed college (21%) compared with the
population at large (16%).7 The annual income reported for American
Muslims is within two percentage points of the population at large, with 16%
making $100,000 or more, 10% making $75,000–$99,999, 15% making
$50,000–$74,999, 24% making $30,000–$49,999 and 35% making less than
$30,000.8
About 65% of adult Muslims in the United States were born in another
country.9 Though a majority of American Muslims were born abroad, 77% are

Muslims then as Americans. Id. at 3. See also Roberta Mann, Is Sharif’s Castle Deductible:
Islam and the Tax Treatment of Mortgage Debt, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1142 (2009)
(noting that “Muslim American family income roughly tracks that of the population as a whole.”).
4. See id. at 3, 9–10 (basing results on data from its survey and available Census Bureau
data on immigrants’ nativity and nationality). The survey notes that 56% of Muslim American
adults are between the ages eighteen and thirty-nine, making the Muslim adult population in
America substantially younger than the population at large with 40% between eighteen and thirtynine. Id. at 17. See also Mann, supra note 3, at 1142 (noting the difficulty in determining the
precise number of American Muslims because the U.S. Census is prohibited from collecting
religious information and citing studies that “place the Muslim population at between three and
nine million, with an average of 6.7 million.”).
5. See 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 18. At about half, the number of Muslim Americans
who have attended college is lower than the number in the general public. See id. at 2, 18. About
one quarter (23%) of Muslim Americans have completed some college, about 22% are currently
enrolled in college, and about 10% of Muslim Americans have undertaken graduate studies. Id.
at 18. In the general public of the United States, 29% of individuals have completed some
college, 16% have college degrees, and about 9% have had some graduate level study. Id. See
also Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah, Living Islam with Purpose, 17 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 17,
18 n.2 (2008) (describing American Muslims as “one of the most educated and prosperous
Muslim communities in the world”).
6. Laurie Goodstein, Poll Finds U.S. Muslims Thriving, but Not Content, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 2009, at A11.
7. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 18.
8. Id.; see also Mann, supra note 3, at 1142. There is a stark difference between the
economic integration of Muslims in the United States and their integration in Western European
Countries. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 19. In a 2006 survey, Muslim populations in Spain,
Germany, Great Britain, and France reported disproportionately high percentages of their Muslim
population in the lowest income category (73%, 53%, 61%, and 61%, respectively). Id.
9. Id. at 1. Of foreign-born adult Muslims in America, 24% are from the Arab region, 8%
are from Pakistan, 10% are from other parts of South Asia, 8% are from Iran, 5% are from
Europe, 4% are from other parts of Africa, and 6% are from other regions of the world. Id.
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American citizens.10 About 39% of Muslims have immigrated to the United
States since 1990.11 The reasons given by American Muslims for immigration
vary greatly. Close to equal numbers cite educational opportunities (26%),
economic opportunities (24%), and family reasons (24%).12 Twenty percent
say that they came to the United States because of persecution or conflict in
their home country.13
With respect to racial composition, no single racial group constitutes a
majority of the Muslim population in America, with 38% describing
themselves as white, 26% describing themselves as black, 20% as Asian, and
16% choosing to answer other/mixed.14 Yet, in a different poll conducted by
Gallup in March of 2009, only 28% of American Muslims identified as white,
35% as Black, 18% as Asian, and 18% as other.15
Most American Muslims say that religion is very important to them, and
they accept the basic tenets of their faith.16 There is religious diversity within
the American Muslim population. A Pew study found that 50% say they are
Sunni, 22% are Muslim without any affiliation, 16% are Shia, 5% identify as
other, and 7% did not give a response.17 Additionally, 23% of Muslims report

Native-born adult Muslims comprise 35% of Muslims in the United States; 20% are African–
American, and 15% are “Other.” Id. See also Nina J. Crimm, Muslim-Americans’ Charitable
Giving Dilemma: What About a Centralized Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 375, 382 (2008). Another 7% of Muslim Americans have parents who
were immigrants. Id. at 381. The Muslim immigrants come from at least sixty-eight different
countries. Id. at 382.
10. Id. at 15.
11. See id. at 1. Years immigrated by the 65% of Muslims who are foreign-born: 18%
immigrated between 2000–2007, 21% immigrated between 1990–1999, 15% immigrated between
1980–1989, and 11% immigrated before 1980. Id.
12. Id. at 16.
13. Id. Of those citing conflict or persecution as a reason for immigrating are those
emigrating from: Iran (26%), Arab nations (19%), and South Asian countries (19%). Id.
14. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 17. The survey further broke down each racial group into
whether the Muslim was foreign born or native born with 56% of native-born Muslims describing
themselves as black. Id.
15. THE MUSLIM WEST FACTS PROJECT, MUSLIM AMERICANS: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 21
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 GALLUP POLL], available at http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/
File/116074/AmericanMuslimReport.pdf. The Gallup poll also compared these statistics on race
with Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Mormons in the United States, where 76%–93% were
reportedly white. Id.
16. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 24. Seventy-two percent of Muslim Americans responded
that religion was “very important” and 40% of Muslim Americans attend a mosque more than
once a week. Id. A March 2009 Gallup Poll revealed that 80% of Muslim Americans answered
in the affirmative when asked whether religion was an important part of their daily life. 2009
GALLUP POLL, supra note 15, at 28. Additionally, the report found that 41% of young Muslim
Americans (18–29) attend their place of worship at least once a week. Id. at 97.
17. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 21.
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that they are converts to Islam.18 Ninety-one percent of converts were born in
the United States and 59% of all converts are African–American.19 There are
around 2000 Islamic schools, mosques, and centers in America.20
Although Muslims have lived in the United States for over one hundred
years, “they have lived largely at the margins of political history.”21 Their
involvement in political and legal matters has been limited.22 For many years,
American Muslims “enjoyed a degree of anonymity that allowed them to
concentrate on economic advancement and pursuit of the American dream.”23
It was not really until the 1990s that American Muslims began to mobilize at
the local and national levels to assert themselves politically and legally—
particularly to pursue violations of their civil rights.24 As a result of this
mobilization, organizations like the Council on American–Islamic Relations
(CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America, among others, were
formed.25
With regard to political views, the Pew study found that American
Muslims are largely liberal with regard to the size and scope of government,26
but socially conservative.27 A majority of American Muslims either lean
towards or identify with the Democratic Party (63%).28 Of the general public,
51% lean toward or identify with the Democratic Party.29
At the same time, many American Muslims—particularly secondgeneration American Muslims, are becoming actively involved in the political

18. Id. at 22.
19. Id. Fifty-five percent of converts subscribe to Sunni tradition, and 49% of converts
converted before age twenty-one. Id.
20. Council on American-Islamic Relations, supra note 1.
21. See Kathleen M. Moore, Muslims in the United States: Pluralism Under Exceptional
Circumstances, 612 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 122 (2007).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 123.
24. Id. at 125.
25. Id. at 125–26.
26. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 41. Seventy percent of U.S. Muslims reportedly prefer
bigger government, versus the general public where 43% prefer bigger government. Id. at 41, 44.
Additionally, 73% of Muslims say that the government should do more to aid the poor. Id. at 41.
27. See id. With regards to protecting morality, 59% say that the government should do
more compared with the general public where only 37% believe the government should do more
to protect morality. Id. at 41, 46. Also, 61% said that homosexually should be discouraged
instead of accepted or neither. Id. at 45. Of the general public, 51% of Americans said that
homosexuality should be accepted. Id.
28. Id. at 41. Seventy-one percent of Muslim Americans say they supported John Kerry in
the 2004 presidential election. Id. The higher percentage of Muslims who voted Democratic may
correlate to the Pew finding that 75% of Muslim Americans believe that going to war in Iraq was
wrong. Id. at 49.
29. Id. at 42.
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process.30 In the past several years, the first two American Muslims were
elected to Congress.31 Muslims strongly supported the candidacy of Barack
Obama, although that support was not without controversy.32 In any event,
like many immigrant communities that preceded them, American Muslims are
starting to contribute to American society on a more active level.33 “While
their parents’ generation might prefer isolation from the mainstream, the
political involvement of young Muslim Americans is increasing, demonstrated
by the rising number of registered voters, civil servants, and candidates for
public office.”34
II. POST-9/11 CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MUSLIMS35
This working knowledge of the identity of American Muslims illuminates
life for Muslims after the attacks of 9/11. A 2007 Pew Research Study found
that 53% of American Muslims say it has become more difficult to be a
Muslim in the United States since September 11, 2001.36 This belief is widely
held by wealthier and better-educated Muslims.37 Twenty-five percent of
Muslims in the United States say they have been victims of discrimination.38
FBI Hate Crime Statistics from 2000 and 2001 indicated over a 1600%
increase in hate crimes reported as “anti-Islamic.”39 The number of actual
crimes against Muslims rose from twenty-eight in 2000 to 481 in 2001.40

30. Carla Power, The New Islam, NEWSWEEK, MAR. 16, 1998, at 37.
31. The first two Muslim Congressmen are Keith Ellison of Minnesota and Andre Carson of
Indiana. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Muslims Seeking Greater Influence—Effort Puts Resumes
of Top Candidates in White House Hands, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 2009, at 10.
32. See id. (documenting reports of Obama’s staff preventing Muslim women wearing hijab
from being photographed behind him).
33. Kathleen M. Moore, supra note 21, at 122–23.
34. Id.
35. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, THREAT AND HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING,
DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–12 (2004), available at
www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/report/rp_report.pdf (assessing the Civil Rights concerns of
Muslim Americans and containing narratives of victims of racial profiling).
36. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 4. Additionally, most American Muslims “believe that the
government ‘singles out’ Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring.” Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 35. Sixty-five percent of those who have attended graduate school and 68% of
those with incomes of $100,000 or more say it has become more difficult to be Muslim in post
9/11 America. Id.
38. Id. at 4. Forty-one percent of native-born Muslims claim they have been victims of
discrimination versus 18% of foreign born. Id.
39. See Jonathan K. Stubbs, The Bottom Rung of America’s Race Ladder: After the
September 11 Catastrophe Are American Muslims Becoming America’s New N . . . . s?, 19 J.L. &
RELIGION 115, 121 (2004) (citing Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting
(foreword) (2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01hate.pdf).
40. James Curry Woods, The Third Tower: The Effect of the September 11th Terrorist
Attacks on the American Jury System, 55 ALA. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003) (quoting Curt Anderson,
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These crimes included assaults (both physical and verbal), threats, vandalism,
and even murder.41 Specifically, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, men were
charged in Seattle and Texas in attempting to burn down local mosques.42 In
Arizona, an Indian Sikh gas station owner (apparently mistaken for a Muslim)
was murdered in response to the attacks.43
Discrimination against Muslims also took other forms. CAIR, a national
civil rights advocacy group, reports yearly on the status of Muslim civil rights
in the United States.44 In its 2001 report (for the year 2000), CAIR reported a
15% increase in the number of civil-rights complaints from the previous year.45
The main complaints were by Muslims for the lack of accommodation in their
workplace and schools for daily prayers, Friday prayers, and other Islamic
rituals.46 The most numerous complaints were hijab related.47
In its 2002 report (for the year 2001), CAIR reported that the United States
government’s action post-9/11 affected more than 60,000 American
Muslims.48 CAIR received 1516 complaints, which represented a three-fold
increase in the number of complaints—most of which were bias-motivated
harassment or violence.49 Excluding September 11 backlash incidents, the
normal reporting period contained 525 validated complaints—an increase of
43%.50 Such incidents included firings or refusal to hire; failure to
accommodate religious practices in schools, workplaces, and prisons; profiling
in airports; the detention or interrogation of Muslims by federal or local
authority; and denial of services or access to public accommodations.51

FBI Reports Jump in Violence Against Muslins, VICTORIA ADVOC., Nov. 25, 2002, available at
http://www.thevictoriaadvocate.com/24hour/nation/story/645165p-4867767c.html).
41. Riad Z. Abdelkarim, M.D., American Muslims and 9/11: A Community Looks Back and
to the Future, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Sept–Oct. 2002, at 82.
42. Woods, supra note 40, at 210.
43. Id.
44. CAIR is the largest American-Muslim civil rights organization in the United States,
serving more than seven million American Muslims through its thirty-five chapters and offices
nationwide and in Canada. COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF
MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.cair.com/
Portals/0/pdf/civilrights2008.pdf.
45. CAIR, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), available
at http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRightsReports/2001Report.aspx.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. CAIR, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002), available
at http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRightsReports/2002Report.aspx.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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More recently, in its 2008 Report (for the 2007 calendar year), CAIR
processed a total of 2652 civil rights complaints.52 While there were decreased
incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime complaints as well as alleged incidents at
schools or incidents involving the police, they are still prevalent.53
For instance, in June of 2007, a twenty-six-year-old Muslim man was
attacked while leaving a St. Cloud, Minnesota mosque.54 He was called a
“Muslim terrorist” and shoved and elbowed in the head by the assailant.55 The
police were notified, and they called the attack a bias-motivated crime.56
On August 8, 2007, an “acid bomb” was thrown out of a car window near
Muslims (an imam and another mosque official) standing outside an Arizona
mosque, the Albanian American Islamic Center of Arizona.57 The bomb
landed within twenty to twenty-five feet of them.58 They reported “a chemical
smell after the container exploded,” but no one was hurt.59
In September of 2007, an Iranian American salon owner was opening her
shop in New York when two assailants surprised and viciously beat her.60 The
men called her “terrorist” and wrote anti-Muslim slurs on a mirror in her
salon.61
In addition to these hate crimes, “[d]iscrimination in the workplace
increased by 18%, with 384 cases reported in 2006 and 452 cases reported in
2007.”62 In one report made to CAIR in April of 2007, a sixty-six-year-old
Muslim worker reported that fellow co-workers at a BMW Manufacturing Co.
plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina repeatedly made comments to him such
as, “Muslims are no good. They should all be killed,” and, “We will f**k up
your family, we’ll kill you all.”63 This situation escalated when one of the coworkers confronted the Muslim in a restroom at work, put a boxcutter to his

52. CAIR, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2008),
available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/civilrights2008.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Associated Press, Man Is Charged with Assault Allegedly Attacked Man After Prayer,
INFOCUS NEWS, June 26, 2007, available at http://www.infocusnews.net/content/view/15499/
327/; see also CAIR, supra note 45, at 20.
55. Associated Press, supra note 48.
56. Id.
57. Arizona Mosque Targeted in “Acid Bomb” Attack, REUTERS, Aug. 8, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN0833871920070808?feedType=RSS&rpc=2
2&sp=true; CAIR, supra note 45, at 21.
58. CAIR, supra note 45, at 21.
59. Id.
60. James Fanelli, Muslim Biz Gal Beaten, N.Y. Post, Sep. 16, 2007; CAIR, supra note 45,
at 21.
61. CAIR, supra note 45, at 21.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Muslim BMW Worker Says He Was Threatened, Columbia State, April 5, 2007; see also
CAIR, supra note 45, at 23.
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throat, and said: “I’ll slice your throat and kill you.”64 The Muslim worker
filed a report with the Spartanburg County Sheriff’s Office.65
Also in 2007, two Muslim workers were fired and three others left their
employment with the Gold’n Plump Poultry plant in Arcadia, Wisconsin.66
The workers’ dispute arose out of the company’s “floating break” policy.67
During this break, the workers would perform the fajr prayer (the break-ofdawn prayer), one of five daily Islamic prayers.68 The company previously
accommodated the prayers with a floating break for several months, but
subsequently issued a new policy that prevented the workers from performing
their religious obligations.69
While there were decreases in cases involving due process issues, physical
violence, denials of service or access, and verbal harassment, they are still a
part of the reality in which Muslims live in America. Women have reported
discrimination based on wearing the hijab (traditional Islamic head covering).
In July of 2007, a Muslim woman was denied entry into a municipal courtroom
in Georgia because she was wearing a hijab.70 This is despite the fact that she
consented to walk through the metal detector and to allow the officers to scan
her scarf with a handheld metal detector.71 Subsequently, in December of
2008, a Muslim woman was jailed after a dispute at another Georgia
courthouse over whether she could enter the courtroom with her hijab.72
CAIR reports that in 2007, passenger-profiling complaints jumped from
thirty-two in 2006 to 141 in 2007, a 340% increase.73 Most notably, in
November of 2006, six imams (clerics in Islam) were removed from a US
Airways flight reportedly because they were praying together before boarding
the plane, which caused some staff and passengers to become suspicious.74
The six imams were removed from the flight and questioned for several hours
by law enforcement officials before being released.75 No charges were filed

64. CAIR, supra note 45, at 23.
65. Id.
66. Oskar Garcia, 70 Somalis Who Quit Jobs over Prayer Time Return to Work,
JOURNALSTAR.COM , May 26, 2007, http://www.journalstar.com/business/article_c5a4ef36-5a735abb-97ec-5c7a2a2ea873.html. See also CAIR, supra note 45, at 23.
67. CAIR, supra note 45, at 23.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Ponder, supra note 1, at 38; see also Associated Press, Muslim Woman Barred from
Georgia Courtroom for Wearing Scarf, July 1, 2007.
71. Ponder, supra note 1, at 38.
72. Associated Press, U.S. Judge Jails Muslim Woman over Headscarf, MSNBC, Dec. 17,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28278572/?gt1=43001.
73. CAIR, supra note 45, at 5.
74. Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effects on
Muslims in America, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 83, 96 (2007).
75. Id.
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against these men.76 These men subsequently filed suit, which will be
discussed in more detail in the next section of this paper.77
More recently, in January of 2009, nine Muslim passengers were removed
from an AirTran Airways flight at Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport.78 The Muslim passengers were reportedly removed from the flight
because another passenger overheard one of the Muslims ask his wife where
the safest place to sit on the plane would be.79 These Muslims were not
allowed to reboard the plane and were detained for interrogation by local law
enforcement officers, the FBI and TSA.80 They were later cleared after
questioning and offered refunds.81 The airline later issued a public apology to
the Muslim passengers as well as to the other passengers on the flight for their
inconvenience, acknowledging the misunderstanding and made an offer to
compensate the passengers.82
Overall, nine states and the District of Columbia made up more than 80%
of all the discriminatory complaints made to CAIR in 2007.83 As is true with
prior years, a person’s ethnic background, religion, or “Muslim name” were
the paramount factors that triggered discrimination.84 These criteria are likely
to have been responsible for 63% of all cases reported to CAIR in 2007.85
III. RECENT CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION BY MUSLIMS
Much, though certainly not all, of the discrimination against American
Muslims has been reported to law enforcement and civil rights groups. In
some of these cases, American Muslims sought to challenge the discrimination
in court. This section discusses these cases. This is not intended to be a
laundry list of all American Muslim-inspired litigation, but rather seeks to
analyze a few recently prominent decisions dealing with the civil rights of
American Muslims in post-9/11 America.

76. Id.
77. See Part III.B infra.
78. Liz Robbins, Muslim Family Excluded from AirTran Flight, http://thelede.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/01/02/muslim-family-excluded-from-airtran-flight/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2009);
see also Part III.C infra.
79. Robbins, supra note 79.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. CAIR, supra note 45, at 5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Work Place Discrimination Suits

After the 9/11 attacks, discrimination against American Muslims in the
workplace based on religion and/or national origin rose tremendously.86 Some
of these Muslims started going to the courthouses to address this
discrimination—with some, although limited, success. Recently, in January
2009, Abraham Yasin filed a two-count complaint against Cook County
Sheriff’s Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Cook County and the Cook
County Sheriff’s Office, alleging a Title VII hostile work environment claim
based on national origin and a hostile work environment claim based on
ancestry under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.87 One defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing, “Yasin has failed to establish that the alleged conduct was
severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of his employment and
create a hostile and abusive work environment.”88 The district court disagreed
and found that “[v]iewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Yasin’s
favor . . . he has presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact for
trial that his co-workers’ conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter the
conditions of his employment and create a hostile and abusive work
environment.”89 Specifically, the court found that Yasin’s co-workers made
remarks about his ancestry and national origin at least one hundred times in
over one-year—including remarks such as “terrorist,” “sand nigger,” “bin
Laden,” “shoe bomber,” and “camel jockey.”90 The court concluded, “In sum,
[we] would be hard-pressed to conclude, as a matter of law, that the
correctional officers’ conduct did not create a hostile work environment based
on Yasin’s national origin and ancestry.”91
The defendant also argued that they were entitled to summary judgment
because Yasin failed to present evidence that there was a basis for his
employer’s liability.92 The parties agreed that the defendant was aware of
Yasin’s allegations regarding the inappropriate conduct by his co-workers.93
The question before the court was “whether the Sheriff’s Office was negligent
in discovering or remedying the alleged harassment.”94 The court found that
“taking well over a year to address Yasin’s harassment complaints is not a

86. Ponder, supra note 1, at 32–33.
87. Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 2009 WL 1210620, at *1 (N.D. Ill.May 4, 2009).
Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed in March of 2007 and the complaint filed in January of
2009 was a second amended complaint. See Complaint, Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept.,
No. C-01266 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2007).
88. Yasin, 2009 WL 1210620 at *4.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *5.
92. Id.
93. Yasin, 2009 WL 1210620 at *5.
94. Id.
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‘prompt’ or ‘expeditious’ reaction to the complaints, especially in light of the
numerous times Yasin complained to his supervisors and IAD.95 The court
concluded, “Based on these circumstances, Yasin has raised an issue of fact for
trial whether the Sheriff’s Office took an ‘appropriate corrective action [that is]
reasonably likely to prevent harassment from recurring.’”96 Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment was thereby denied and the case proceeded to
trial.97 In July of 2009, the jury returned a verdict for Yasin in the amount of
“$200,000 in damages for harassment it found to be so pervasive or severe to
create a hostile and abusive work environment.”98
Other Muslim plaintiffs have not been as successful. In April 2009, the
Third Circuit affirmed a district court decision that police officer Kimberlie
Webb’s request to wear a headscarf with her uniform could not be reasonably
accommodated without imposing an undue burden upon the City of
Philadelphia.99
In February 2003, Webb, a practicing Muslim, was denied permission to
wear a headscarf100 while in uniform and on duty.101 Although the headscarf
would cover neither Webb’s face nor ears, Philadelphia Police Department
Directive 78102 did not authorize “the wearing of religious symbols or garb as
part of the uniform.”103 On August 12–14, 2003, Webb wore her headscarf to
work, but was sent home each day when she refused to remove it.104 After
being informed on August 14, 2003 that her conduct could lead to disciplinary
action, Webb discontinued wearing the headscarf to work.105 Nevertheless,
Webb received a thirteen-day suspension for insubordination.106
Following her suspension, Webb brought suit alleging violations under
Title VII for religious discrimination, retaliation/hostile work environment, and

95. Id. at *6.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Press Release, CAIR, CAIR-Chicago Wins Bias Suit for Arab-American Officer (July
24, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS202828+24-Jul-2009
+PRN20090724); see also Judgment in a civil case, Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., No. C01266 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2009).
99. Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009).
100. “The headscarf (a khimar or hijaab) is a traditional headcovering worn by Muslim
women.” Id.
101. Id.
102. Directive 78 is “the authoritative memorandum which prescribes the approved
Philadelphia police uniforms and equipment.” Id.
103. Id.
104. Webb, 562 F.3d at 258.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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sex discrimination.107 The district court granted summary judgment against
Webb on all counts reasoning “the City would suffer an undue hardship if
forced to permit Webb and other officers to wear religious clothing or
ornamentation with their uniforms.”108 Webb appealed the adverse judgments
on the religious and sex discrimination to the Third Circuit.109
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court’s holding that Webb
established a prima facie case for religious discrimination in that: (1) “Webb’s
religious beliefs are sincere;” (2) “her employer understood the conflict
between her beliefs and her employment requirements;” and (3) “she was
disciplined for failing to comply with a conflicting official requirement.”110
Thus, the burden shifted to the City to demonstrate that to reasonably
accommodate Webb would impose an undue hardship.111 The City contended
an undue hardship existed because “[i]f not for the strict enforcement of
Directive 78 . . . the essential values of impartiality, religious neutrality,
uniformity, and the subordination of personal preference would be severely
damaged to the detriment of the proper functioning of the police
department.”112 Webb contended genuine issues of material fact existed
because “other police officers displayed religious symbols, such as cross pins
on their uniforms, with no disciplinary repercussions.”113 The Third Circuit,
having noted the “presumption of legislative validity” given to a police
department’s choice of organization and dress,114 agreed with the City.115 In
affirming the district court’s adverse judgment, the Third Circuit concluded
that “uniform requirements are crucial to the safety of officers . . . morale and
spirit de corps, and public confidence in the police.”116
Despite the mixed results of Yasin and Webb, American Muslims plaintiffs
continue to battle workplace discrimination and attempt to assert their rights in
court. For instance, Waheed Rehan, a Muslim man from Pakistan, filed a suit
in July of 2009 in federal district court alleging that he suffered similar
harassment at his place of employment, resulting in his unjustified
107. Id. Webb also brought one cause of action under the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom
Protection Act.
108. Id. at 258–59. The District Court also stated, “[Directive 78’s] detailed standards with no
accommodation for religious symbols and attire not only promote the need for uniformity, but
also enhance cohesiveness, cooperation, and the esprit de corps of the police force.” Webb v.
Philadelphia, 2007 WL 1866763, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
109. Webb, 562 F.3d at 259.
110. Id. at 261.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 262. The court held Webb presented no specific evidence of her assertions that
would create a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
114. Webb, 562 F.3d at 260. (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1975)).
115. Id. at 262.
116. Id.
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termination.117 Rehan claims that he faced discrimination by his co-workers at
his former employer, Affiliated Computer Services.118 Rehan was subjected to
such remarks as “terrorist” and “bin Laden.”119 In addition to verbal attacks,
Rehan was subjected to physical abuse such as having aerosol cleaner sprayed
on his head and eyes.120 Rehan reported the conduct, but his bonuses were
subsequently cut significantly, and his workload increased, before finally being
terminated without justification.121 Rehan brought several causes of action
alleging discrimination based on religion, national origin, and race, as well as
for retaliation.122 The case is currently stayed pending arbitration.123
B.

Racial Profiling and Discrimination Against Muslims while Traveling

Another area where American Muslims face discrimination is in traveling.
Since 2001, the Department of Transportation has received over 1000
complaints of discrimination against United States airlines.124 Similarly, the
Transportation Security Administration has received over 1000 complaints
against its personnel.125 American Arab and Muslim organizations continue to
document this type of discrimination. American Muslims are reporting this
conduct to the proper authorities and agencies—but they are also filing
lawsuits.
In 2002, Assem Bayaa brought a claim for illegal discrimination against
United Airlines following his removal from a flight.126 Bayaa is “an American
Citizen of Lebanese and Palestinian descent who works full time in Saudi
Arabia, but travels to California frequently to visit family and to conduct
business.”127 United Airlines provided the most convenient route between the
two countries, and was thus regularly used by Bayaa.128 On December 23,
2001, Bayaa arrived at LAX to board a United Airlines flight back to Saudi
Arabia.129 When Bayaa checked his two suitcases that morning, one was
117. Complaint, Rehan v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., No. 09-04106 (N.D.Ill. July 8,
2009).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Complaint at 6, Rehan, No. 09-04106.
123. Order on Motion to Stay, Rehan v. Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., No. 09-04106
(N.D.Ill. July 27, 2009).
124. Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate Impact Claims Would
Not Harm National Security—A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 513–14
(2009).
125. Id. at 514.
126. Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., 249 F.Supp. 2d 1198, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
127. Id. at 1199.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1200.
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immediately “searched on the spot.”130 After passing through security without
incident, Bayaa arrived at his gate where he was searched with a hand-wand
and his carry-on bag was inspected.131 Once aboard the plane, but before
taking his seat, Bayaa was asked to exit the plane because “the crew [did] not
feel comfortable having [him] on board.”132 After being removed from the
flight, United Airlines attempted to book Bayaa another flight; however,
“[e]mbarrassed and humiliated, Bayaa refused the flight, and traveled, instead,
on another airline.”133 Bayaa subsequently filed discrimination claims under §
1981 and Title VI seeking injunctive and declaratory relief that “the court
declare illegal [United Airlines’] alleged pattern and practice of removing
individuals from flights based on perceived Middle Eastern ethnicity, and to
enjoin [United Airlines] from engaging in this conduct in the future.”134
United Airlines filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Bayaa’s claims were
preempted by the Warsaw Convention.135 But the court rejected this
contention holding the Warsaw Convention preempted claims for damages, not
claims for equitable relief such as Bayaa’s.136 Having decided Bayaa’s claims
were not preempted, the court’s analysis turned to whether it could redress
Bayaa’s alleged injury.137 The court reasoned that because Bayaa is an
American citizen who travels frequently on United Airlines from his place of
work in Saudi Arabia to visit his family, and conduct business in America, he
demonstrated “that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of [the
violation].”138 As such, Bayaa would be entitled to injunctive relief. In
rejecting United Airlines’ final argument, that the injunction would conflict
with its duty to use discretion under 49 U.S.C. § 44902,139 the court stated that
“[d]efendant’s duty under 49 U.S.C. § 44902 does not grant them a license to
discriminate.”140 Accordingly, the court denied United’s motion to dismiss.141
The parties ultimately agreed to settle the case.142 In addition to a $94,000
payment, United Airlines agreed to provide various non-monetary relief, such

130. Id.
131. Bayaa, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1200, 1205.
135. See id. at 1201.
136. Bayaa, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1201–02.
137. Id. at 1205.
138. Id.
139. Id. This statute addresses the regulations under which an air carrier may refuse to
transport passengers and property. See 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2006).
140. Bayaa, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
141. Id.
142. Motion of Entry into Comprehensive Settlement Agreement at 1, Bayaa v. United
Airlines, No. 02-B-48191 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. Mar. 21, 2005).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

A NEW DAWN FOR MUSLIMS

931

as annual civil rights training to its public contact employees, and to ensure
appropriate follow-up to any discrimination complaints.143
More recently, six imams who were removed from a U.S. Airways flight
brought causes of action for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to
freedom from unreasonable seizures and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to
equal protection of the law.144 On November 20, 2006, the imams were
traveling back home after attending a conference in Minneapolis, Minnesota.145
While waiting at the gate for their U.S. Airways flight, three of the six men
decided to pray their final two prayers of the day—the other three remained in
their seats.146 The men prayed “for roughly five minutes” and boarded the
plane soon after.147 The men were not seated together, and took their seats
throughout the cabin.148 At some point, a passenger passed a note to the
captain relating that he had seen “six Middle Eastern men praying loudly in
Arabic in the gate area and saying ‘Allah, Allah.’”149 Airport police were
called in and the passenger who passed the note related his observations to the
police and noted the “‘mysterious’ or ‘weird’ seating arrangement” of the
imams.150 The police decided the loud prayers and seating configuration
“amounted to suspicious behavior” and the imams were removed from the
plane and taken into custody.151 The imams were placed in police cars and
taken to the police command center where they were separated, isolated, and
interrogated for five to six hours before being released without being
charged.152 When they then tried to rebook a flight, U.S. Airways denied them
service.153
In support of their unlawful seizure claim, the plaintiffs alleged there was a
lack of reasonable articulable suspicion when the FBI officer requested their
detention for questioning, or alternatively, there was a lack of probable cause
to arrest the plaintiffs.154 Upon reviewing the information available to the FBI
and Metropolitan Airport Commission (“MAC”) officials at the time of the
arrest,155 the court reasoned “[the FBI agent] has not identified any crime, nor

143. Id. at 7.
144. Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways, 645 F. Supp. 2d 765, 771, 774, 777, 789 (D.Minn. 2009).
145. Id. at 771.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 772.
148. Id.
149. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 772–73.
150. Id. at 773.
151. Id. at 774.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
155. This information was: “(1) three of the Plaintiffs observed the Muslim Maghreb prayer at
the gate before boarding Flight 300; (2) Shahin and Sadeddin requested seatbelt extensions; (3)
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does the court know of any crime, for which these allegations create arguable
probable cause.”156 As such, the court held the arrest of the plaintiffs
constituted “a violation of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures.”157 Moreover, the court denied the FBI agent’s claim
for qualified immunity stating that “no reasonable officer could have believed
that the arrest of Plaintiffs was proper.”158
The court reached the same conclusions when analyzing the unlawful
seizure claim against the MAC. In finding no basis for probable cause, the
court stated:
After only a cursory, routine investigation, several of these concerns would
have been eliminated leaving no basis for probable cause based on the
remaining information. Praying in public, commenting on current events, and
even criticizing governmental policy is protected speech under the First
Amendment. Plaintiffs’ Middle Eastern descent does not change the analysis.
Similar behavior by Russian Orthodox priests or Franciscan monks would
159
likely not have elicited this response.

The court found the MAC’s attempt to use the events of September 11 as a
defense for its actions unpersuasive:
Defendants suggest that the attacks of September 11, 2001—perpetrated by
men of Middle Eastern descent who espoused a radical version of Islam—
justifies a massive curtailment of liberty whenever terrorism, and in this case,
the suspicion of Islamic terrorism, is concerned. Unquestionably the events of
9/11 changed the calculus in the balance American society chooses to make,
especially in airport settings, between liberty and security. Ultimately, the
proper balance will be achieved, in large part, because we have the most
capable and diligent law enforcement and intelligence communities in the
world. But when a law enforcement officer exercises the power of the
Sovereign over its citizens, she or he has a responsibility to operate within the
bounds of the Constitution and cannot raise the specter of 9/11 as an absolute
160
exception to that responsibility.

Shahin left his seat to talk to Sadeddin; and (4) Plaintiffs were Muslim clerics, possibly of Middle
Eastern origin.” Id. at 779.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 780.
159. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
160. Id. at 788; See Chowdhury v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1154 (N.D.Cal.
2002) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss by reasoning “[t]he fact that the pilot is in control
of the aircraft does not . . . ‘grant [the airlines] a license to discriminate.’”); but see Dasrath v.
Cont’l Airlines, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 433 (D.N.J.,2006) (Muslim plaintiff’s case dismissed
on summary judgment); Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008) (reversing a
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff).
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The court also denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
Plaintiffs alleged the MAC “intentionally
equal protection claim.161
discriminated against them based on their race, religion, color, or national
origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . .”162 The court found that among the factors considered in
detaining the plaintiffs were: their “Middle Eastern ethnicity,” their “Arabic
dialect,” and the chanting of the words “Allah, Allah, Allah.”163 The court
reasoned these facts “could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that they were
arrested at least partly on the basis of their race, religion, or national origin.”164
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied.165 The
decision was appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.166
Subsequently, the parties reached a confidential settlement.167
These suits alleging post-9/11 racial profiling and discrimination by
airlines have been met with some success. More importantly, these lawsuits
have raised awareness of this significant problem, and potentially will begin to
open dialogue, and promote education by airlines, regarding these
discriminatory practices.
C. Religious Charities
Finally, one area of major concern to American Muslims is the treatment
of Islamic charities in post-9/11 America. On September 23, 2001, just days
removed from the attacks of 9/11, President Bush issued Executive Order
13,224 in response to the “grave acts of terrorism . . . and the continuing and
immediate threat of further on United States nationals or the United States.”168
Executive Order 13,224 gave the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (“OFAC”) “broad authority to designate individuals and
organizations as ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists’ (“SDGTs”).”169
Such a designation allows OFAC to freeze all assets of a SDGT pending
investigation pursuant to a blocking order, and criminalize all transactions with

161. Id. at 789.
162. Id. at 788–89.
163. Id. at 789.
164. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
165. Id.
166. Shqierat v. U.S. Airways Group, 645 F. Supp. 2d (D.Minn. 2009), appeal docketed, No.
09-2979 (8th Cir. Sept. 18, 2009).
167. Shqierat v. U.S. Airways Group, No. 07-1513 (D.Minn. filed Oct. 10, 2009)
(confidential settlement agreement reached).
168. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
169. David Klass, Asset Freezing of Islamic Charities Under the International Economic
Emergency Powers Act: A Fourth Amendment Analysis, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 155, 156 (2007).
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the designated entity.170 In the years since 9/11, Executive Order 13,224 has
been used to block the assets of American Muslim charity organizations. In
response, these organizations have turned to the courts to challenge the
constitutionality of these blocking orders.171
Initial efforts by Muslim charities to attack the blocking orders met with
little success. On December 4, 2001, OFAC designated Holy Land Foundation
as a SDGT due to allegedly acting for or on behalf of Hamas.172 At the time,
Holy Land was the largest American Muslim charitable foundation with a
budget of close to $12 million.173 In conjunction with the SDGT designation,
OFAC issued a blocking order “freezing all of [Holy Land’s] funds, accounts
and real property.”174
Holy Land subsequently challenged the SDGT designation and blocking
order in court, alleging various statutory and constitutional violations.175 But
the court rejected Holy Land’s claims,176 including its Due Process177 and
Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure challenges.178 In rejecting the Due
Process claim, the court reasoned the OFAC action “flows from a
Presidentially declared national emergency”179 thus qualifying as an
“‘extraordinary’ situation in which postponement of notice and hearing until

170. See id. at 160. “Neither the IEEPA nor the Executive Orders specify what evidence is
needed to issue a blocking order—apparently it is within OFAC’s discretion.” Id. at 161.
171. For further discussion of the statutory framework behind the blocking orders and the
implementation against American Muslim charities, see generally Laila Al-Marayati, American
Muslim Charities: Easy Targets in the War on Terror, 25 PACE L. REV. 321 (2005); Klass, supra
note 169; Danielle Stampley, Blocking Access to Assets: Compromising Civil Rights to Protect
National Security or Unconstitutional Infringement on Due Process and the Right to Hire an
Attorney?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 683 (2008).
172. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62, 64 (D.D.C.
2002). Hamas is a large and influential militant Palestinian political group. See Backgrounder:
Hamas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Aug. 27, 2009) available at http://www.cfr.org/
publication/8968#p1.
173. See Al-Marayati, supra note 171, at 324.
174. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 64. OFAC also entered Holy Land’s headquarters,
without a warrant, and removed “all documents, computers, and furniture.” Id.
175. Id. Holy Land filed a cause of action alleging violations of: (1) the Administrative
Procedure Act; (2) the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment; (3) the Takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment; (4) the Fourth Amendment; (5) the First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and association; and (6) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. See also Klass, supra
note 169, at 169 (explaining the evidence that Holy Land was linked with Hamas).
176. See Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 65–85 (analyzing Holy Land’s various
claims).
177. Id. at 76.
178. See id. at 78–80.
179. Id. at 76.
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after seizure d[oes] not deny due process.”180 Turning to the Fourth
Amendment claim, the court held “blocking of this nature does not constitute a
seizure.”181 The court reasoned the freezing of accounts was not an unlawful
seizure because “the Government plainly had the authority to issue the
blocking order pursuant to the IEEPA and the Executive Orders and the Court
has determined that its actions were not arbitrary or capricious.”182
Similar attempts by Muslim charities met with similar results. For
example, on October 13, 2004, OFAC designated the Islamic American Relief
Agency183 (“IARA”) as a SDGT, and blocked the assets of IARA and five of
its officials.184 Like Holy Land, IARA challenged the action in court alleging
various constitutional violations, including Due Process and Fourth
Amendment claims.185 But relying heavily on the Holy Land opinion,186 the
court ruled in favor of the government.187
Although successful challenges to a SDGT designation and blocking order
may be limited, a recent case out of Ohio may offer hope to Muslim charity
plaintiffs in the future. The case, KindHearts v. Geithner,188 has been heralded
as “a victory for all Americans who value the constitutional rights to due
process and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.”189
KindHearts is a nonprofit corporation, incorporated under Ohio law, with
the stated goal to “provide humanitarian aid without regard to religious or
political affiliation.”190 On February 19, 2006, OFAC, without prior notice,
issued a blocking order which froze all of KindHearts’ assets pending

180. Id. at 76–77 (quoting Calero–Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680
(1974)).
181. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
182. Id. at 78. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision in 2003. Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
183. The Islamic American Relief Agency was based in Columbia, Missouri, and was
established in 1985 as a nonprofit humanitarian relief organization. Islamic Am. Relief Agency
v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2005).
184. Id. at 40.
185. Id. at 39.
186. See id. at 47–50 (analyzing IARA’s claims and repeatedly citing Holy Land for support).
187. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the lower court decision. Islamic Am. Relief
Agency v. Gonzalez, 477 F.3d 728, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming district court on other
grounds).
188. See infra notes 192–205, 208–17 and accompanying text.
189. Press Release, CAIR, CAIR Welcomes Ruling in Support of Muslim Charity’s Due
Process Rights (Aug. 19, 2009) (quoting Nahid Awad, CAIR National Executive Director),
http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?mid1=777&&ArticleID=26061&&name=n&&currPage
=1# (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
190. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864
(N.D. Ohio 2009).
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investigation.191 The blocking order “effectively shut the organization
down”192 by indefinitely freezing all KindHearts’ assets and property,
“including about one million dollars in bank accounts.”193
In April 2006, and again in November 2006, KindHearts attempted to
respond to the block via letter, but received no response from OFAC.194 More
than a year after the initial block, on May 25, 2007, the OFAC finally
acknowledged receipt of KindHearts’ April and November correspondence and
“notified KindHearts that OFAC had provisionally determined to designate
KindHearts a [SDGT].”195 OFAC never made a final designation as to
KindHearts status as a SDGT; meanwhile, “[f]or almost three years OFAC has
blocked KindHearts’ property and property interests and criminalized all
transactions with it.”196 During those three years, the OFAC “provided no
explanation of the specific charges it was considering against KindHearts or
why it thought the evidence supported a potential designation.”197 Moreover,
the OFAC restricted KindHearts access to its own documents needed to rebut
OFAC claims as well as funds to pay for legal counsel.198
KindHearts alleged OFAC’s actions were unconstitutional for a number of
reasons, including that the actions amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation
for unreasonable seizure, as well as a violation of due process.199 Rather than
dismissing the Fourth Amendment claim by relying on precedent, the court
declined to follow the Holy Land and IARA holdings.200 The court concluded
these prior cases had erroneously applied a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
analysis to the OFAC blocking actions, rather than the “lower threshold” of a

191. Id. at 865. The Treasury Department also issued a press release on its website
announcing the block for alleged affiliations with Hamas. Id. at 867.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
196. Id. at 870.
197. Id. at 868.
198. Id. at 868–69.
199. Id. at 864
KindHearts alleges that OFAC’s actions are unconstitutional because: 1) OFAC’s
block is an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 2) provisions
authorizing OFAC to designate SDGT and block assets pending investigation are void for
vagueness under the Fifth Amendment; 3) OFAC denied KindHearts procedural due
process before provisionally determining it to be an SDGT and blocking its assets; and 4)
OFAC has unconstitutionally restricted plaintiff’s access to the resources it needs to
mount a defense. KindHearts further claims that OFAC blocked KindHearts’ assets
without proper statutory authorization.
Id.
200. See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 871–72.
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Fourth Amendment seizure analysis.201 The court reasoned that because the
OFAC blocking actions interfere with possessory rights, and are not
necessarily a permanent deprivation, they are properly considered a “seizure”
under the Fourth Amendment.202
But the government argued OFAC blocking actions should be excluded
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny because: (1) historically, the Fourth
Amendment has not been applied to blocking actions; and (2) deference should
be given to the President regarding foreign affairs.203 In rejecting the
government’s first contention, the court noted none of the prior TWEA204 and
IEEPA205 cases asserted a Fourth Amendment interest, as they involved
economic sanctions on foreign governments.206 In contrast, the court reasoned:
KindHearts’ situation differs strikingly and significantly from that of the
foreign governments and foreign assets at issue in the TWEA and IEEPA cases
on which the government relies . . . .
KindHearts is indisputably one of “the people” protected by the Fourth
Amendment. If the Constitution affords KindHearts no protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whom among “the people” does it protect
207
and who among the people can be certain of its protection?

In addressing the historical argument advanced by the government, the
court acknowledged “compelling parallels between the instant case and the
colonial-era activities inspiring the Founders to include the Fourth Amendment
in our fundamental charter of liberties.”208 The court completely dismissed the
government’s first assertion by stating, “[t]o find the Fourth Amendment
inapplicable to OFAC blocking actions would disregard the Amendment’s
history and its role as a bulwark against the abuses and excesses of unchecked
governmental power.”209
201. Id. at 872.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 872–73.
204. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65–91, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2006)). “During wartime, TWEA both made it a crime to
engage in specified forms of commerce with America’s enemies, and delegated to the President
the power to regulate or prohibit a variety of other economic transactions with both enemies and
allies.” Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2005).
205. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07 (2006). The
IEEPA was an attempt to improve upon the TWEA by specifying the President can invoke
IEEPA powers only in limited circumstances and “authorizes the President to impose whole or
partial economic embargoes during emergencies.” Chesney, supra note 204, at 5.
206. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
207. Id. at 874.
208. Id. at 874–76 (discussing the colonial era struggles with government as reason to include
the Fourth Amendment in the Constitution).
209. Id. at 876.
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The court also disagreed with the government’s second argument that
deference should be given to the executive on matters regarding foreign
affairs.210 The court reasoned that “[l]egislation cannot authorize the President
to ignore the Bill of Rights. Under the Fourth Amendment, the federal
government ‘as an undivided whole’ lacks entirely the power to conduct
unreasonable searches and seizures.”211 Finding no “special needs” or exigent
circumstances that would excuse the general warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the OFAC
block constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.212
Turning to KindHearts’ Due Process challenge, the court concluded “the
government’s actions regarding the blocking order failed to provide the two
fundamental requirements of due process: meaningful notice and opportunity
to be heard.”213 The court characterized the “notice”214 given to KindHearts as
“piecemeal and partial”215 leaving the organization “largely uninformed about
the basis for government’s actions.”216 The court applied the three-factor
Mathews217 test to the notice given by OFAC and held “consideration of the
Mathews factors leads inescapably to the conclusion that OFAC violated
KindHearts’ fundamental right to be told on what basis and for what reasons
the government deprived it of all access to all its assets and shutdown its
operations.”218 The court also held OFAC’s lengthy and repeated delays in
responding to KindHearts violated the “due process requirement of prompt
post-deprivation hearing.”219 This decision, with its strong language and
reasoning, serves as a significant victory for American Muslim charities as it
upheld constitutional protections afforded all Americans, and curtailed the
government’s unfettered discretion in these types of cases.

210. See id. at 876–78.
211. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 877 (emphasis
removed).
212. See id. at 789–882 (discussing exceptions to probable cause and warrant requirements).
213. Id. at 897. The court however, found it could not presently determine the extent to
which KindHearts had been prejudiced by the violation if its constitutional rights and that the due
process challenge to the provisional SDGT designation is not ripe for adjudication. Id. at 908–10.
214. The notice given was summarized as “the letter KindHearts received informing it of the
government’s decision, the thirty-five unclassified, non-privileged exhibits, and a redacted
version of the provisional determination evidentiary memo.” Id. at 904.
215. Id. at 901.
216. Id. at 904.
217. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In applying the test, courts must weigh:
“First, the private interest . . . affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used . . . ; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that . . .
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
218. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
219. Id. at 906–08.
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IV. Learning from This Litigation
Understandably, the United States underwent a dramatic political shift
after the 9/11 attacks; but American Muslim litigants are working to keep those
attacks from giving the government free reign to disregard basic civil rights in
this country. As Judge Montgomery points out in the Shqeirat case “[W]hen a
law enforcement officer exercises the power of the [s]overeign over its
citizens, she or he has a responsibility to operate within the bounds of the
Constitution and cannot raise the spector of 9/11 as an absolute exception to
that responsibility.”220 In the Shqeirat case, Judge Montgomery reminds law
enforcement and others that “[p]raying in public, commenting on current
events, and even criticizing governmental policy is protected speech under the
First Amendment.”221 Further, she emphasized that this is as true for Muslims
and people of Middle Eastern descent as it is for Russian Orthodox priests or
Franciscan monks.222 Judge Montgomery suggests that if the government
defendants in the Shqeirat case had only educated themselves, however briefly,
about the exact situation of the Imams praying before entering the plane, they
would have plainly seen the lack of probable cause for their detention.223
Sadly, for many American Muslims—particularly those challenging
blocking orders used to essentially shut down American Muslim charities
allegedly thought to be terrorist organizations—Judge Montgomery’s
comments fall on deaf ears.224 As can be seen from the Holy Land and IARA
decisions, those courts chose to approve of the government’s actions with
respect to the blocking order because they found no Due Process violation, as
well as no unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.225
Judge Carr in the KindHearts decision, however, took the Holy Land and
IARA cases and decisions head on, finding that in fact the government did
violate the Fourth Amendment in its use of the blocking order against
KindHearts.226 Specifically, as Judge Carr stated, “Kindhearts is indisputably

220. Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways, 645 F. Supp. 765, 788 (D.Minn. 2009) (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 786.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See supra, Part IV. Muslims have responded to the blocking orders in court, but also on
a more practical level. A Muslim group called Muslim Advocates has started its own
accreditation for Muslim charities. See Press Release, Muslim Advocates, First American
Charities Accredited Through Ground Breaking Program (Aug. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.muslimadvocates.org/documents/MCAP1_rls.pdf; Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Muslim
Charities Learn Transparency, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 2009; Jeff Karoub & David Grant, Listing
Clears Cloud Over Islamic Charities, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 20, 2009.
225. Id.
226. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev. v. Geithner, 2009 WL 2514057, at *17–21
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2009).
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one of the people protected by the Fourth Amendment.”227 Here, like Judge
Montgomery, we see a district court refusing to grant the government
unfettered power, and reminding the government that it owes constitutional
rights and protections to its citizens and organizations. Despite the losses in
Holy Land and IARA decisions, the court in KindHearts reminds us, very
directly, “If the Constitution affords Kindhearts no protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whom among ‘the people’ does it protect
and whom among the people can be certain of its protections.”228 After years
of delay, this Muslim American organization was finally able to receive the
relief it sought—protection of its civil and constitutional rights.
This and the few recent victories discussed in this article, however, do not
significantly alter the present challenging reality of Muslims in America.
Along with fear over the present and future status of their civil rights, there is
also a large degree of frustration among U.S. Muslims. The frustration
involves what is actually a constant struggle against a type of civic blackmail
which demands Muslims in the U.S. to be utterly compliant, or run the risk of
having their patriotism called into question. As a result there is a certain pall of
229
silence that has been cast over the community.

Many American Muslims do not feel free to express themselves in a public
setting,230 much less in a court room. While young American Muslims have
become increasingly more active in American politics and society as a whole,
“the vast majority of U.S. Muslims are simply trying to keep beneath the radar
screen. They are understandably not asking questions and not challenging
assumptions for fear of government reprisals.”231 Those that do may face
courts and judges who are willing to struggle to find the proper balance
between the protections of civil rights and the exercise of government and
police powers. This balance may or may not tip in their favor, as American
Muslims saw in the Webb case.232 While more judges appear willing, contrary
to Judge Montgomery’s decision, to use 9/11 as a blanket justification for
whatever action the government chooses to take,233 American Muslims have to
continue to challenge this discrimination in court in hopes that the Constitution
and the rule of law will prevail. Over time, with a succession of legal victories

227. Id. at 11.
228. Id.
229. Scott Alexander, Inalienable Rights? Muslims in the U.S. Since September 11th, 7 J.
ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 103, 119 (2002).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 119–20
232. See Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 2009).
233. See, e.g., Dasrath v. Cont’l Airlines, 228 F.Supp.2d 531, 540 (D.N.J. 2002) (“In this case
Plaintiffs’ burden will be a heavy one considering the heightened actual dangers arising from the
increased risk of terrorist acts . . . .”).
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and judicial support for American Muslims’ civil rights, the fear and
frustration they experience may begin to subside.
V. CONCLUSION
The future of these cases and the future of American Muslims’ civil rights
in post-9/11 America is still uncertain. What is certain, however, is that
American Muslims can no longer afford the image that they are isolationists
and removed from everyday civil rights struggles. While certain cases
discussed in this Article have brought about some successful results and
possibly further tolerance and understanding, the civil rights battles continue
and American Muslims appear more prepared than ever to fight for these rights
in court. Of course, these Muslims are not just fighting for their own rights,
but the rights of all Americans. Just like so many immigrants and religious
minorities before them, American Muslims are asserting themselves in an
important part of American society, one civil rights case at a time.
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